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Water allocation in the West is regulated by a volcanic
hierarchy of federal and state laws and policies.
Eruptions have increased in frequency as states and
their citizens lament the increasing control that the
federal government has begun to exert over several
western river basins pursuant to federal statutes such as
the Endangered Species Act.1 For example, at a recent
conference investigating how Columbia and Snake
River irrigators can improve habitat for endangered and
threatened anadromous fish species, Washington
Senator Marilyn Rasmussen, chairwoman of the Senate
Agriculture and Rural Economic Development
Committee, bluntly asserted that “[t]he federal
government needs to butt out – this is our state.”2
Such assertions deserve profound scrutiny because of
the frequency with which they are expressed in regional
public water policy meetings; the influential positions
of state officials who adhere to them; and most
importantly, the barriers they create between federal
and state officials in several ongoing cooperative
attempts to resolve the serious environmental problems
vexing the region. Accordingly, we consider why the
federal government has intervened in water policy (an
area typically perceived to be within the purview of
states), and explore the parameters of actual and
potential federal intervention. We also examine the
problems with relying on traditional state policy to

allocate water among competing private and public uses in
the modern era without continued federal intervention.
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN STATE WATER
ALLOCATION POLICY
The federal government has intervened in state water
policy to finance large-scale water projects, secure water
legislatively earmarked for Indian reservations, protect
public water uses, determine the constitutionality of state
restrictions on interstate water transfers, and resolve
interstate water disputes. These functions often have been
undertaken in response to either a state request or a federal
obligation to protect public interests neglected in state
water allocations.
Federal Water Development
States traditionally accommodated increased demands for
water by expanding supplies (Gould 1988). Water
development took the form of dams, associated water
impoundment reservoirs, and long-distance canal systems.
The expense of such major development went beyond the
financial capabilities of individual farmers, cooperative
associations of farmers, and the governments of small
western states and territories.
Moreover, private
investment companies generally viewed such projects as
overly risky and capital-intensive. Consequently, western
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interests successfully lobbied the federal government to
finance western water development with terms provided
in a series of reclamation acts beginning in 1902. The
controversy over whether the federal government or the
states would control the federally-developed water
crystallized early. State interests contended that:
“[T]he federal government was welcome, indeed
morally obliged, to fund reclamation in the West.
Control over water, however, would remain with
the western states. Bernard DeVoto described
the unreconstructed, states-rights sentiment that
would guide western attitudes toward the federal
government, water, and reclamation during the
twentieth century: “Get out and give us more
money” (Wilkinson 1992, p. 245; DeVoto quote
from Stegner, 1987, p. 9).”
The 1902 Act satisfied the states’ desire for control of
federally-developed water by deferring to state water
law, thereby ensuring that the water would be allocated
subject to the prior appropriation doctrine. However,
state control of this water was not unrestricted. Terms
provided in the 1902 and subsequent reclamation acts
imposed restrictions on water and land use to protect
federal financial and social interests in project water.
For example, to spread the benefits of project water
widely among resident farmers, the 1902 Act limited
each landowner receiving federally subsidized water to
160 owned acres within the project area and required
each to reside on or near his land. To counter later
circumvention of the owned acreage restriction by large
scale leasing of farmland in project areas, the
Reclamation Act of 19823 increased the acreage
restriction to 960 acres, but included leased land in this
total for the first time.
Federal Protection of Interests Neglected by States
States applied their prior appropriation water allocation
systems4 to lock available water into irrigated
agriculture without regard for federal water rights
reserved to Indians or for public interests in water.
In Winters v. United States,5 the Supreme Court held
that when the federal government established Indian
reservations it reserved the quantity of water needed to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation. Neither state nor
federal officials protected Winters rights as water was
being fully appropriated into state water systems:
“. . . state officials effectively read Winters out of
existence through a business-as-usual approach
of granting state water rights and allowing
diversions that directly conflicted with Indian

rights. Federal officials, supposedly bound to act as
trustees for Indian rights, were, if anything worse.
They pushed for federal subsidies for non-Indian
projects on Indian rivers and ignored potential
Indian projects” (Wilkinson 1992, p. 268).
Winters rights date back to the legal action establishing the
reservation. Because reservations predate many non-Indian
settlements, Winters rights often have seniority when
enforced against rights perfected under state laws of prior
appropriation. Moreover, Winters rights are not subject to
forfeiture for non-use under state prior appropriation laws,
and so do not lose their seniority when finally enforced.
Consequently, modern day enforcement of Winters rights
has cast serious clouds over state water rights, especially
those in the most fully appropriated basins.
In an attempt to resolve the fear and uncertainty
surrounding unused or unsettled Winters rights, states and
tribes have enlisted the aid of the federal government to
negotiate a series of formal settlements quantifying Winters
rights and restricting state water allocations accordingly.
Congress has ratified at least fifteen such settlements since
1982 (Hare 1996).
Some significant features
characterizing these settlements are: (1) a tribe can market
Indian water off-reservation subject to state water law (e.g.,
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe settlement in Nevada); (2) a
tribe settles for less than potential Winters entitlement in
exchange for avoiding potential litigation and settling past
claims (e.g., Fort McDowell Indian Community settlement
in Arizona), or receiving a permanent supply at an earlier
date (e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe settlement in New
Mexico); (3) a tribe agrees to subordinate some portion of
its Winters rights to avoid disrupting a state’s prior
appropriative water allocations (e.g., Colorado Ute Indian
settlement in Colorado); and (4) a tribe receives economic
development fund for use on the reservation (e.g., TruckeeCarson-Pyramid Lake settlement in Nevada) (Hare 1996).
Similar to Winters rights, public interests in water were not
protected as water was being fully appropriated into state
water systems. For example, nondiversionary uses, such as
maintaining instream flows for fish and wildlife habitat,
were not traditionally viewed as beneficial uses, and thus
did not qualify for water under state appropriation
doctrines. Consequently, traditional appropriative right
holders could “with impunity . . . literally dry up streams,
as . . . happened with some regularity” (Wilkinson 1992 p.
21).
In the last few decades, states have begun to recognize
instream flow protection as a beneficial use, and have
legislated procedures to establish instream flow rights.
However, these procedures generally are fraught with
restrictions that frustrate the transfer of appropriated water,
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or the dedication of any remaining unappropriated
water, to instream use (Huffman 1983; Benson 1998).
For example, Nebraska law prohibits the transfer of
water from one use (e.g., agriculture) into another (e.g.,
instream flow),6 and the states of Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington authorize only state agencies (subject to the
considerable influence of politically powerful user
groups) to dedicate unappropriated water to instream
flows.7 Private citizens in these states are not
authorized to purchase water rights for the
enhancement of instream flow. Moreover, water rights
recently dedicated to instream flow enhancement by
state authorities are subordinate in priority to traditional
appropriative rights, which allows the latter rights to
continue dewatering rivers during times of water
scarcity.
Public interests in water have received their best
protection through federal statutes such as the
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act.8
The extent to which these environmental statutes
authorize the federal government to disrupt statecreated water rights is controversial. At one extreme,
some commentators believe that such statutes create
“federal regulatory rights” by empowering the federal
government to “cancel the historic de facto assignment
of property rights in commons to exploiters and
reassign them to the government as agent for the public
generally” (Tarlock 1985, p. 3). At the other extreme,
some federal courts have held that the federal
government must defer to state-created water rights in
the absence of explicit congressional intent to preempt
them.9 Despite this controversy, the supremacy clause
of the U.S. Constitution 10 clearly empowers Congress to
preempt state water rights by federal statute if it so
chooses.
Federal Constitutional Concerns
The federal government also has intervened in state
water policy when a state law encroaches on powers
delegated to the Congress by the U.S. Constitution, or
when the resolution of interstate water disputes requires
constitutionally mandated federal consent.
The Commerce Clause11 of the U.S. Constitution
provides that “[t]he Congress shall have the Power . . .
[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”
The U.S. Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has held that
this express grant of congressional power also implicitly
restricts state power to impose undue burden on
interstate commerce. This implicit restriction is
referred to as the “dormant commerce clause.” The
Supreme Court is the final arbiter regarding the
consistency of state laws with the dormant commerce
clause.

State laws restricting the export of instate water resources
have aroused Supreme Court scrutiny under the dormant
commerce clause. In City of Albus v. Carr,12 the Supreme
Court resolved that groundwater is an article of commerce
subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, and struck
down a Texas law forbidding the interstate exportation of
groundwater without legislative approval as an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. In Sporhase
v. Nebraska,13 the Supreme Court formulated its twopronged procedure for determining the constitutionality of
interstate water export statutes. A statute found to be
“facially” discriminatory (i.e., one explicitly banning
interstate commerce) is subjected to the Supreme Court’s
strictest scrutiny requiring that the state prove that the
statute serves a legitimate state purpose, that it is narrowly
tailored to that purpose, and that no adequate lessdiscriminating alternatives exist. Nebraska’s “reciprocity”
statute (requiring that the importing state’s law would need
to grant reciprocal rights to export its groundwater for use
in Nebraska) failed to pass this test, and thus was found to
be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
Alternatively, a state statute not found to be facially
discriminatory is subjected to lesser scrutiny requiring that
the Supreme Court find that it strikes a permissible balance
of federal and legitimate state interests. Nebraska’s
“finding” statute (requiring that the withdrawal of the
groundwater to be exported be reasonable, not contrary to
conservation, and not detrimental to the public welfare)
passed constitutional muster on this basis.
The above line of decisions has elicited strategic behavior
on the part of states attempting to improve their chances of
successfully defending restrictions on interstate water
exports against constitutional challenge. One such
behavior is to restrict intrastate water transfers to a similar
extent as interstate transfers. The underlying legal
reasoning seems to be that a state cannot be found to
unconstitutionally discriminate against out-of-state water
transfers if it imposes similar restrictions on in-state
transfers. The opportunity cost of this behavior is that the
state foregoes the gains from trade resulting from beneficial
intrastate water transfers. The Sporhase decision does not
offer great hope that such behavior will salvage an
otherwise impermissible restriction on interstate trade.
Since blatant protectionism is not a legitimate state interest
for a water export statute, a state generally will specify
water conservation as the desired objective. The Supreme
Court will require that the restriction operate evenhandedly
by dividing the burden of conservation equally between instate and out-of-state users. However, as demonstrated in
Sporhase, the key to this determination is whether the state
similarly restricts in-state water use (e.g., groundwater
pumping) – not whether the water once extracted can be
traded in-state.
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States also defend or implement protectionist water
policies on the grounds that such policies are required
for states to satisfy their obligations under interstate
water compacts. An interstate water compact is a
negotiated agreement between two or more states
regulating the allocation of water, water quality, flood
control, etc., among the states. The most common are
water allocation compacts, of which there are 21 among
the western states (Bennett). The Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he compact . . . adapts to our Union of
sovereign states the age-old treatymaking power of
independent sovereign nations.”14
The federal
government’s involvement is mandated by the Compact
Clause15 of the U.S. Constitution which requires
Congressional consent to interstate compacts. After
Congressional consent, the compact is considered to be
federal law not subject to Commerce Clause
restrictions. 16
A line of defense for states whose water laws restricting
interstate commerce are constitutionally challenged in
federal courts has been to demonstrate that the laws are
required for the states to satisfy an interstate water
compact. In response to Nebraska’s attempt to defend
its reciprocity restriction on this basis in Sporhase, the
Supreme Court held that Congressional intent to
remove state water law from scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause must be expressly stated in the
compact. The subsequent case of City of El Paso v.
Elephant Butte Irrigation District17 demonstrated that
federal courts would rely on an extremely literal reading
of compacts to ensure that Congress clearly intended to
shield state water law from Commerce Clause scrutiny.

States also may implement protectionist water policies
by manipulating their obligations under interstate water
compacts. While market transfers of water rights
between two states may not be explicitly prevented, an
interstate compact specifying the water quantity
obligation of the upstream state to the downstream state
may provide an institutional means to restrict and
effectively prevent interstate water transfers. Consider
a simple example. Assume that A (a citizen of the
upstream state) sells B (a citizen of the downstream
state) 10 units of water. Assume further that the
upstream state counts the 10 units that A sells to B as
part of the water it is legally obligated to deliver to the
downstream state under compact. Citizen A satisfies
her obligation to B by reducing her water use by 10
units. The upstream state, by maintaining compact
quantity interstate deliveries, now has 10 additional
units of water that it can reallocate within the state,
leaving the downstream state to satisfy the 10 units of
water purchased by B out of the existing compact
allocation. With no additional water delivered, the

downstream state will not acknowledge the water right
transfer or deliver water to B, thereby effectively preventing
this and future interstate transfers.
The above two “interstate compact” strategies will come
under increasing federal scrutiny if states apply them to
frustrate cooperative federal-state efforts to increase
instream flows for endangered wildlife. The Cooperative
Agreement for Platte River Research (1997), entered into
by the Governors of Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming
with the U.S. Secretary of the Interior (Secretary), provides
an interesting example. Under threat of direct federal
intervention, and as part of a program to improve habitat
for four endangered species, the three states have agreed to
develop and implement programs to increase instream
flows at specified times of the year in central Nebraska by
130,000 to 150,000 acre feet per year. Although private
interstate water transfers are among several alternatives
being considered to increase instream flow in the target
area in a consulting report conducted for the Cooperative
Agreement’s Governance Committee (Boyle Engineering
Corporation), such transfers will be adjudged, or effectively
rendered, infeasible to the extent that federal regulators
allow the cooperating States to pursue the “interstate
compact” strategies.
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Ironically, much of the federal intervention in state water
management has been at state request to finance water
expansion projects or to mediate settlements with groups
whose prior rights were not respected by state prior
appr opriation systems. The federal government also has
intervened to enforce constitutional strictures against state
imposed restrictions on interstate commerce in water, and
to perform its constitutional duties to consent to interstate
compacts (Congress) or equitably apportion interstate water
resources among states (Supreme Court). The era of
federally-financed large-scale water development is over
(Gould 1988), but the other justifications for federal
intervention will persist because Winters rights disputes
have not been completely settled and the federal
government cannot abandon its responsibility to ensure that
state water laws and interstate agreements are
constitutional.
The federal government likely will intervene most heavily
in the recovery and protection of water-reliant species listed
as threatened or endangered pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act.18 Federal recovery plans might require that
legal precedence be given to the instream flow needs of
these species over the traditional appropriations of state
water right holders at critical times and locations. The
possibility that the federal government might directly
intervene in the allocation of in-state water resources to
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protect instream flows is resented by western states and
traditional water right holders who view the prior
appropriation doctrine as the rightful center of the water
allocation universe.
Can the prior appropriation doctrine reasonably be
expected to meet the modern-day challenge of
allocating water among competing private and
environmental uses if the federal government were to
“butt out”? Unfortunately, past performance does not
offer great hope that state prior appropriation systems
across the West will be equal to this challenge in either
theory or practice because of the following problems:
1. Junior Priority of Instream Flow Rights. Instream
flow rights recently established under the purview of
state prior appropriation systems are junior in
priority to the appropriative rights previously locked
into irrigated agriculture. Consequently, instream
flow rights have the highest likelihood of not filling
when most needed to protect fish and wildlife
habitat during severe water shortages in fully
appropriated river basins.
2. Noncompliant Water Users. Instream flow rights
are imperiled by wide ranging extractive activities
that are noncompliant with rights established under
prior appropriation, and are allowed to continue
unabated by state water officials. For example,
environmental groups are pursuing legal action
against the State of Washington to force the State’s
Department of Ecology to ban noncompliant
groundwater withdrawals (i.e., groundwater pumped
beyond levels specified in water rights) because of
their detrimental impact on streamflows (Spokane
Spokesman Review 1999). In another example, a
1993 survey found that over 500 users (mostly
irrigators) were taking water without a valid right in
Whatcom County, Washington. State water officials
not only did not take meaningful enforcement action
against the violators, but the 1997 Washington
Legislature approved a bill (later vetoed by the
Governor ) that would have legalized these invalid
uses (Benson).
State efforts in identifying,
ascertaining, and stopping noncompliance are
plagued within each state by inadequate budgets
(Spokane Spokesman Review 1999), and West-wide
by inconsistent enforcement policies across states.
For example, the Idaho State Supreme Court held
that the state water agency has a mandatory duty to
curtail noncompliant water use to protect sensor
appropriators, 19 whereas the Washington State
Supreme Court held that the state agency had no
such authority.20

3. Technological Change in Agriculture. The security of
instream flow rights also has eroded in the face of
gradual and widespread improvements in on-farm
irrigation efficiency. 21 Because improved technologies
commonly require less than one-half of the original
water duty to achieve increased levels of consumptive
water use in crop production, efficiency-improving
irrigators contend that the unused portion of the
original water duty represents conserved water that they
can spread over land nonappurtenant to the original
right (i.e., water spreading) or sell to others without
impairing other water rights.
However, basic
hydrologic principles indicate that not only is no
additional water created when irrigation efficiency is
increased in the return-flow hydrologic systems
characterizing the West, but more water is consumed at
the intensive and extensive margins of use (Huffaker
and Whittlesey 1995). States mistakenly allowing
efficiency-improving irrigators to retain some fraction
of the unused portion of their water duty as conserved
water (e.g., Oregon 22) unintentionally permit these
irrigators to enlarge their uses at the expense of public
efforts to increase streamflows for fish and wildlife.
4. Inflexibility of Prior Appropriation. The junior priority
of instream flow rights would not be a major problem if
state prior appropriation systems were sufficiently
flexible to allow water transfers from traditional to
instream uses. Indeed, economists have demonstrated
that shifting water from irrigation to hydropower
production in the Pacific Northwest would generate
benefits ten times greater than lost farm income, and
two times greater if the flows were shaped specifically
to meet the migratory needs of endangered fish species
(Hamilton and Whittlesey 1992). Unfortunately, the
transfer of diversionary rights can breach the security of
use-dependent rights by changing the timing, quantity,
and quality of return/escape flows. States protect
appropriators from such breach, and protect agricultural
water supplies, by imposing moderate to severe limits
on water transfers (Gould 1988). For example, Idaho
does not allow transfers that “would significantly affect
the agricultural base of the local area,”23 and, as
mentioned above, Nebraska does not permit transfers
from agriculture into another use. Such protective
efforts have been identified as the principal deterrent to
the development of water markets within the framework
of the prior appropriation system (Perala and Benson
1995).
5. Reticence to Use Alternate Legal Authority to
Strengthen Instream Flow Rights. An appropriative
water right grants the owner the right to use publicly
owned water. As owner of the water itself, the public
reserves the right to condition private water use so that
7

it is consistent with public values, and western states
do this to a limited degree in their water statutes
(Wilkinson 1992). The public trust doctrine24
provides states with an additional source of legal
authority for conditioning appropriative water rights
to the degree needed to protect public resources.
This could entail rejecting applications for new
appropriations that would harm trust values, and
continually supervising and regulating existing
rights to ensure continuing compatibility. The
extent to which states have applied the public trust
doctrines to condition appropriative water rights
differs significantly across the West. At one
extreme, the California Supreme Court held that the
public trust doctrine allows the state to reconsider
past water allocation decisions and requires a
balancing of public and private needs in water.25 At
the other extreme, an Idaho statute precludes the
application of the public trust doctrine in
conditioning water rights.26

CONCLUSION
The common assertion that the federal government
should “butt out” of state water policy has little
justification. The federal government continues to have
a number of legitimate reasons for intervention in state
water policy. It must protect its financial interests in a
number of large-scale water projects built at state
request, satisfy its constitutional obligations to protect
interstate commerce in water and oversee interstate
compacts and equitable apportionments, and satisfy its
statutory and public trust obligations to protect water
uses traditionally neglected by states (e.g., Indian water
rights and environmental uses). Federal intervention to
protect aquatic ecosystems is especially justified because
of intrinsic shortcomings in the theory and application
of state prior appropriation systems in providing such
protection and the reticence of states to appeal to
alternative legal doctrines better suited to the purpose.
The authors are members of Western Regional Research
Project W-190 entitled “Agricultural Water
Management Technologies, Institutions and Policies
Affecting Economic Viability and Environmental
Quality.”

submitted to the Department of Economics, University
of Colorado.
Benson, Reed. 1998. “Maintaining the Status Quo:
Protecting Established Water Uses in the Pacific
Northwest Despite the Rule of Prior Appropriation.”
Research Publication PO97-1, Northwest Water Law &
Policy Project.
Boyle Engineering Corporation. 1999.
“Water
Conservation/Supply Study, Platte River Research
Cooperative Agreement.” Draft Report for the
Governance Committee; p.6-14.
Gardner, B. D. 1983. “The Untried Market Approach to
Water Allocation.” Paper presented at Conference on
the Colorado River, Bishop’s Lodge, Santa Fe, New
Mexico.
Hamilton, J., and N. Whittlesey. 1992. “Contingent Water
Markets for Salmon Recovery.” Unpubl. working
paper. University of Idaho, Department of Agricultural
Economics.
Hare, John. 1996. “Indian Water Rights.” Office of Trust
Responsibilities, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington
D.C.
Huffaker, R., and N. Whittlesey. 1995. “Agriculture
Water Conservation Legislation: Will It Save Water?”
Choices (Fourth Quarter):24-28.
Huffaker, R., N. Whittlesey, and J. Hamilton. 2000. “The
Role of Prior Appropriation in Allocating Water
Resources into the 21st Century.” International Journal
of Water Resources Development 16(June), in press.
Huffman, J. 1983. “Instream Water Use: Public and
Private Alternatives,” in Water Rights. T. Anderson, ed.
(San Francisco: Pacific Institute).
Hutchins, Wells A. 1971. “Water Rights Laws in the
Nineteen Western States.” 3 Volumes, Miscellaneous
Publication No. 1206. Natural Resource Economics
Division, Economic Research Service, United States
Department of Agricultural.
Perala O., and R. Benson. 1995. “Water Transfers: Can We
Get There From Here?” Illahee 11:16-18.

REFERENCES
Bennett, Lynne. 1994. “The Economics of Interstate
River Compacts: Efficiency, Compliance, and
Climate Change.” Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation

The Spokane Spokesman Review. Dec. 4, 1999. “Water
Suit Against Agency Headed to Court.”
Stegner, Wallace. 1987. “The American West as Living
Space.” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
8

Stevens, J. 1980. “The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s
Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People’s
Environmental Right.” 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195.
Tarlock, D. 1985. “The Endangered Species Act and
Western Water Rights.” 20 Land and Water L. Rev.
1-30.
Wilkinson, Charles 1992.
“Crossing the Next
Meridian.” Washington D.C.: Island Press.

ENDNOTES

1.

percolation to an underlying aquifer (return flows), or
escape by the same means to a second water course (escape
flows). Downstream appropriators rely on return/escape
flows to supply, along with natural flows, a portion of their
water rights.
By the early twentieth century, many western states had
adopted formal administrative permit procedures designed
to consolidate historic water rights, provide for the orderly
creation of future rights, and provide for the oversight
needed to enforce appropriative water law. Under these
procedures, a person desiring to execute a new
appropriation must apply to the state which determines
whether sufficient water is available to fund the new right
without harming senior appropriators, and establishes the
conditions of use [See, e.g., Hutchins, 1971].
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207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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R.R.S. Neb. §46-294(2).

16 U.S.C. §1531-1543 (1982)
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Associated Press, “Agribusiness looks to win support
on water, fish issues.” Moscow-Pullman Daily News,
Weekend, November 27 & 28, 1999, p. 4C.
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3.

8.

33 U.S.C. §1344 (1982).

9.

See, e.g., California v. U.S., 438 U.S. 645 (1978).

43 U.S.C. §390 (1982).

4.

The prior appropriation doctrine is an outcropping of
nineteenth century western mining law that extended
the allocation rule of “first in time, first in right” to
surface water resources. Briefly, a person attains a
user’s (usufructory) right to the quantity of public water
that is diverted to a beneficial use on a fixed tract of
appurtenant land. The priority of the right extends back
to the time of first diversion. The “water duty” for the
right is measured on an acre-feet of water per acre
basis, and comprises the quantity of water sufficient to
irrigate an average mix of crops on the appurtenant
acreage with the irrigation technology prevailing when
the water right was granted. Water that is not
beneficially used is forfeited and available for reappropriation by another person (use it or lose it).
During times of water scarcity, senior appropriators
(i.e., those with the longest-term rights) receive their
full entitlements until the water source is completely
depleted. More junior appropriators receive no water at
all.
Junior appropriators are protected from
enlargement of senior rights because senior
appropriators desiring to expand their diversionary
rights beyond the original water duty must execute a
new appropriation having the most junior priority.
Because not all water diverted from the stream
(diversion) is consumed in irrigation (consumptive use),
the unconsumed portion can return to the stream as
surface runoff or as underground spring flow after deep

Idaho Code §§42-1501,1503; Or. Rev. Stat. §537.336;
Wash. Rev. Code §§90.03.247, 90.22.010.

10.

11.

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.

U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3.

12.

385 U.S. 35 (1966).

13.

458 U.S. 941 (1982).

14.

Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92, 58 (1938).
15.

U. S. Const., art. I, §10, cl. 3. “No state shall, without
the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or
compact with another state, or with a foreign power . . . ”
16.

Intake Water Company v. Yellowstone River Compact
Commission, 590 F. Supp. 293 (1983).
17.

18.

563 F. Supp. 379 (1983).

For example, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior recently
entered into a cooperative agreement with the states in the
Platte River Basin (Nebraska, Colorado, and Wyoming) to
develop and implement a long-term recovery program to
aid four threatened or endangered species listed under the
ESA.
9

19.

Musser v. Higginson, 871 P. 2d 809 (Idaho 1994).

20.

Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232
(Wash. 1993).
21.

On-farm irrigation efficiency is calculated as the
ratio of the water stored in the crop root zone for
consumptive use to the total water diverted for
irrigation.
22.

Or. Rev. Stat. §537.455 (Supp. 1994).

23.

Idaho Code §42-222(1).

benefit (Stevens, 1980). For example, the King in
medieval England was obligated to protect public rights
to navigation, transportation, and fishing on lands
along seashores and rivers.
These obligations
accompanied any transfer of the lands by the King into
private ownership.
In the United States, the U.S. Supreme court has
determined that trust responsibilities apply to navigable
freshwater bodies and tidelands. Similar to English
common law, public trust obligations accompany the
transfer of trust resources into state or private
ownership or use.
25.

24.

Public interests in water are protected by the public
trust doctrine – a collection of common law principles
recognizing the government’s obligation to manage
certain types of natural resources in trust for public

National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658
P.2d 709.
26.
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Idaho Code §58-1203(2).

